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1 INTRODUCTION 
Digital rights management has been a controversial subject within the music industry for several 
years now and therefore a substantial amount of industry professionals have sounded their opinion 
on the subject in different magazines, conferences and other mediums. The focus of this thesis has 
been to look for a pattern emerging from these sources and to form an educated answer to the 
research question based on this data. Studies that focus on the effect of digital rights management on 
the music industry could not be found. Academic books written about DRM exist, but because the 
technical nature of this literature does not resonate specifically with the marketing side of the music 
industry, this literature does not play a substantial role in the research carried out in this thesis. The 
research conducted in this thesis has been done through qualitative means, focusing on thematic 
interviews with industry professionals and by reviewing carefully industry journals available to the 
public (Hirsjärvi & Remes, 1997). In order to find answers to the question presented in this thesis, 
an extensive amount of background research on the different retail models within the industry had 
to be conducted. This was accomplished by exploring different existing scenarios of selling and 
distributing digital music and by searching for and noting the opinions of industry professionals 
pertaining to the problems of the industry as regards DRM. 
 The findings from the thematic interviews and industry journals was then mapped out and 
analyzed. Similarities in the opinions and predictions of the professionals have been compared with 
each other. The resulting analysis served to develop new insights and perspectives concerning the 
primary research problem of the study. The thesis concludes with a chapter presenting proposed 
suggestions for the industry and suggestions for further research that the industry may choose to 
carry out.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview of intellectual property law 
Intellectual property laws exist to protect the owners of copyrights, patents, trademarks, industrial 
design rights and trade secrets from wrongful infringement. The owner of the copyright, patent etc. 
is the only one who has the lawful right to exploit this protected property. The rights-owner may 
also give permission for someone else to exploit the protected technology or material, for example 
in exchange for a fixed sum of money or a percentage of the profits. This grant of rights is usually 
referred to as licensing. After a certain amount of time, the protected rights, be it copyright, patent 
or etc. may lose their protection and become part of the public domain. The time period of the 
protection differs between different copyrights, trademarks and patents. 
 Intellectual property laws also include moral rights, which are the rights of creators of 
copyrighted works. Moral rights are generally recognized in civil law jurisdictions. Article 6bis of 
the Berne Convention states: 
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of 
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the 
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or 
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation. (The Berne Convention, 1886) 
 Intellectual property laws and the measures taken to enforce them vary widely from country to 
country and it is therefore difficult to give a very globally representative overview on intellectual 
property law. Many treaties have been made in an effort to harmonize IP laws internationally. These 
treaties include the 1994 World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Rome Convention of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) in 1961, and the Berne Convention in 1886. The main reasons that have 
prevented a cohesive international system from forming have been disagreements over medical and 
software patents and the difference in the scale of enforcing intellectual property laws in different 
countries. In brief, intellectual property laws protect the owners of copyrights, patents and 
trademarks. 
 
2.2 Intellectual property law and the music industry  
The foundation of commercial exploitation of music lies in the protection given by copyrights and 
the effectiveness of national and international intellectual property laws. These laws exist to protect 
copyright holders from infringement. Intellectual property laws as such are quite simple and straight 
forward. The debate and discussion has generally risen from the different methods of enforcing the 
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laws and the different measures taken to ensure that infringement is not possible. 
 
2.3 What is DRM? 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, later referred to as WIPO, digital rights 
management includes two different things. It can include the (technical) enforcement of usage 
restrictions (digital management of rights), or the identification and description of intellectual 
property rights pertaining to works and to parties involved in their creation and administration 
(digital rights management). DRM may therefore refer to the technologies and/or processes that are 
applied to digital content to describe and identify it and/or to define, apply and enforce usage rules 
in a secure manner (WIPO, 2003). 
 
2.4 Digital rights management in the context of the music industry 
According to an analysis in Music Week magazine (2007) the increased use of music encoded using 
MPEG 1 Audio Layer 3, also commonly referred to as MP3, coincided with the startup of Napster 
in 1999. Napster provided the public a free peer-to-peer Website site that allowed people to 
exchange and download music with an ease that had never been possible with physical piracy. After 
suffering for a long time with the rising problem of peer-to-peer downloading, major record 
companies began their fight against digital piracy. In 2001 the UK's first copy-protected CD was 
released, Natalie Imbruglia's White Lilies Island. Many of these early copy-protected CDs were 
returned after the disc failed to play in certain CD and DVD players. Copy protection was 
effectively the first form of digital rights management used by the music industry. The reaction 
from the public to this kind of modified product was reported to be quite negative by the music 
retail industry in the United Kingdom. It was argued by consumers that a copy-protected record was 
actually a worse product than a CD without such protection. Many music industry experts claimed 
that this was exactly the opposite publicity than what the record industry expected and desired 
(Music Week, 2007). 
 It was not long after the first copy-protected release in 2001 when all the major record 
companies began including copy control software into their products. The industry soon realized 
that copy protection was not the ideal solution to piracy they were hoping it would be. Sony BMG 
was the first of the major record companies to face legal action because of their malfunctioning 
copy-protected CDs. In 2005 Texas attorney general Greg Abbott filed a civil lawsuit against the 
major label group. Abbott sought in excess of $100,000 per violation of the state's Consumer 
Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, which came into effect earlier that year (Music Week, 
2005). It was concluded that the copy protection software installed on audio CDs was considered to 
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be “spyware” and had to be removed from use (Music Week, 2005). 
 Piracy has been a problem for the music industry for decades, and by the end of the 1990s 
piracy had done so much damage to the industry that even the major record companies began 
reporting enormous financial losses due mainly to plummeting sales. At the same time marketing 
and A&R costs were rising or at least staying at current levels. It was commonly acknowledged 
within the industry that the main reason for this was illegal peer-to-peer downloading combined 
with traditional piracy in which the product was physically copied. As the new millennium turned 
and the amount of legal sales of downloads started to gain momentum because of companies like 
Apple Computer and its iTunes store, the music industry renewed their fight against illegal copying 
of music (IFPI, 2005). Digital rights management technology was introduced for MP3s. DRM 
application meant that once you bought an MP3 formatted song from iTunes, you had limited rights 
to copy and/or use that certain song.  
 Digital rights management is a very broad concept that has slightly different meanings in 
different industries and therefore this thesis will not be looking into all kinds of DRM.  This thesis 
will concentrate on DRM in the music industry and especially in digitally downloadable music. 
DRM in this context is defined as code embedded into an MP3 file that is designed to protect the 
file from infringement of copyright as defined in intellectual property law.  
 
2.5. The five different approaches to DRM and how they are applied to several business 
models of selling digital music 
  
 2.5.1 Copy protected pay-per-download 
This traditional model of selling digital downloads is still the most widespread business model for 
selling digital music. Nokia’s Music Store, Apple’s iTunes and many other large digital music shops 
use the copy protected pay-per-download model as their main means of business. In this model the 
retailer sells a single MP3s or a bundle of MP3s at a fixed rate to the consumer and after the 
transaction the consumer owns the right to listen to the product with friends and family members 
for perpetuity. This transaction basically grants the customer the same rights that are passed on 
when one purchases a CD. The legality of copying this content varies depending on the local 
jurisdiction. This is the first point where this model gets into trouble. Even though most countries 
declare it illegal to share copyrighted content in either a profit seeking manner or in a manner that 
creates harm to the original copyright owner, in some countries making personal copies is 
considered within the limits of law.  
 The home-copying issues are fought on a certain moral ground, but the real practical problem 
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for the traditional legal download seems to be the problems with interoperability between different 
hardware and software providers. One example occurred when the band Muse began selling a 
download-only single titled Map Of The Problematique. A digital bundle of the release, which 
included a live version of the song recorded at the previous weekend's Wembley stadium show 
coupled with photos and a screen saver, was released through Muse's official site in DRM-protected 
Windows Media format only. The amount of complaints from fans on Muse message boards about 
the fact that the download didn't play on Apple computers or iPods was so large that the Muse 
website began selling the bundle in DRM-free format soon after, contrary to Warner Music's stance 
on DRM at that time (Music Week, 2007). 
 Some experts argue that even in this format's best case scenario, in which the interoperability 
problems were solved, the reality that the legal product that you purchase has little or nothing more 
to offer than the illegal counterpart still exists. The pros would basically only include the actual 
legality of the product and presumably being the more virus free option. 
 
 2.5.2 Seemingly DRM free pay-per-download 
In the spring of 2007 EMI announced that they would supply an entire catalogue of DRM-free 
downloads. The agreement was initially limited to EMI and iTunes, but both sides stated that they 
were keen to extend the initiative further. Apple CEO Steve Jobs (2007) said that he expected 50% 
of iTunes' catalogue to be unprotected by the end of 2007, while EMI Group CEO Eric Nicoli 
(2007) suggested the decision to go DRM-free has been met with an overwhelmingly positive 
response from consumers, artists, retailers and staff (Music Week, 2007). 
 It was also reported that Apple had quietly installed safety measures with the launch of DRM-
free EMI tracks by effectively introducing a new form of copy protection. The situation was that 
Steve Jobs' company, Apple Computer, had begun selling tracks by EMI artists in a new high-
quality, DRM-free format through its newly-launched iTunes Plus service, but every track sold in 
this format was digitally embedded with the buyer's name and email address. This unannounced 
move meant that, while EMI was able to offer interoperable music files that work across multiple 
devices, it was also able to put up a strong disincentive to users who would consider uploading their 
purchased material onto peer-to-peer websites, since few customers were likely to want their names 
and email addresses available in the public domain (Music Week, 2007). 
 The approach that EMI and Apple took is interesting at the least. Calling this new product 
DRM free would still be overreaching a bit even though this approach takes away a lot of the 
restricting elements that are usually related to DRM. 
 Shortly after the move announced by EMI, Warner Music also embraced a limited DRM-free 
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service by signing up to new digital music site Lala.com. One of the few non-Apple sites to be 
iPod-compatible, Lala.com sells tracks without DRM, although music can only be downloaded to 
users' iPods and not their computers. Although much conversation has risen concerning the 
remaining flaws of these new so-called DRM free downloads, the general atmosphere within the 
industry and its consumers seems to be positive regarding the direction of these developments. 
Besides the obvious problems of this DRM solution having no way to copy-control the product, the 
other clear issue may be the pricing which is presented in this following example.  
 The standard iTunes AAC format at 128kbps encoding with copy-protection carried a price of 
79p, $0.99 in the US or e0.99 in mainland Europe. In addition, they also offered these new 
seemingly DRM free tracks at near-CD quality 256kbps encoding, and in AAC format, without 
copy protection, at a higher price of 99p ($1.29/e1.29) per track. iTunes customers were able to 
upgrade their previous EMI track purchases to the premium versions at a cost of 20p per track. And 
in a bid to encourage package sales, the standard album price (typically pounds 7.99) would remain 
for the new premium tracks. This meant that it would be significantly cheaper to buy high-quality 
tracks in album bundles. 
 Even with the new approach to the MP3 retailing, the interoperability issues had not been 
resolved completely. Apple still offered tracks in its AAC format, rather than MP3, which limited 
interoperability. Many popular devices do not support the AAC format. While EMI's new DRM-free 
downloads could be converted into mp3 format, it is a time-consuming process. The bottom line 
was that that, while Apple allowed the customer to use iTunes' DRM-free music on other players; it 
did not go out of its way to make it particularly easy to do so (Music Week, 2007). 
 
 2.5.3 Subscription downloading and streaming 
Spotify, Napster and Rhapsody employ the model in which the consumer has to pay a continuous 
subscription fee for unlimited access to the songs in their services database. These services allow 
the user to listen to samples and obtain downloads of sound recordings and related digital content. 
To access the service, to the consumer must install or activate the online software application and 
then subscribe to the site as a user, and pay the monthly or annual fee set by the site or be willing to 
listen to advertisements between songs. 
 The user may play as many streams as they like and, depending on the chosen service, they can 
download the songs with certain restrictions while their subscription is current. The service they use 
will count the number of times that they stream each track for royalty accounting and analysis 
purposes. The royalties paid for the copyright holders will be dependent of the amount of tracks 
streamed and downloaded by the users. The user may save the download on to the hard drive of 
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their personal computer and play it back as many times as they want for so long as their 
subscription is current. The user may make an unlimited number of downloads while their 
subscription is current and may copy each download to up to two additional personal computers that 
they own (i.e. a total of 3 copies). If the user wishes to burn downloads to CDs or transfer them to 
compatible portable devices they will need to pay for them as purchased tracks. Under these terms it 
is forbidden to share the downloads with anyone else (Napster, 2008). 
 The terms and conditions of Napster (2008) define a purchased track as a track that the user 
may save to up to three of their personal computers and play back at any time, burn to a CD and/or 
transfer to a compatible portable device. Any security technology that is provided with a purchased 
track is an inseparable part of it. This means that trying to tamper with any DRM code embedded 
into the file is considered a violation of the terms and conditions signed by the customer (Napster, 
2008 and Rhapsody, 2008). 
 The most recent model of streaming and subscription services is the model presented by 
Spotify, MySpace Music and Last.fm. This service gathers its revenue from advertising. Usually 
these types of services do not require a fee for their subscription. Senior writer Antony Bruno 
(2008) from Billboard magazine forecasts that the model MySpace Music is using will prevail over 
any other monthly fee subscription services for the obvious reason that MySpace Music is the sole 
service that not only combines all of the ad-supported free streaming and DRM free download 
capabilities of these earlier services, but also adds related products like concert tickets and 
merchandise (Antony Bruno, In With The New, Billboard, 2008). 
 As innovative as this model of selling digital music has said to be, it nevertheless presents 
several problems and inconveniences. The use of a purchased track as presented in the Napster 
model is a very restricted format from the end user’s point of view. It is even more regulated than 
the original pay-per-download format. The technological aspects of streaming should also be taken 
into account. The quality of a stream is in fact quite a bit lower than compared to a download, not to 
mention to a CD as well. Also, the fact that the user has to install the service provider's own 
software on their computer and cannot listen to the stream in most portable devices will most 
certainly be a disincentive for some consumers. 
 The Spotify and MySpace Music models of giving the music away for free to the customer and 
generating the revenue from advertising seems to be the most intriguing model from the customer's 
point of view. The music industry on the other hand has serious issues to solve concerning sharing 
the revenue generated by MySpace Music. Most MySpace web pages have additional content such 
as blogs, video or pictures on them. How does one accurately define what part of the content is 
  12 
deserving of what portion of the advertisement revenue? 
 The revenues of the MySpace Music model are also very closely linked to the popularity of the 
general site, which means that if the popularity of the MySpace Music site were to collapse, the ad 
money would fade away but the product on the website would still be free for the public to 
download. This is a serious consideration for the record companies. It would easily make a 
monopoly out of MySpace because no new web site using this same model would be allowed to put 




 2.5.4 Super distribution 
In this approach a consumer pays a subscription fee and is allowed to download mp3s and given the 
necessary permission to listen to this music on any device he or she owns for 12 months from the 
date of download (as often as he or she would like to do so); he or she may also pass a copy of the 
music to up to ten friends without charge but they can only listen to it a restricted amount of times 
without obtaining a license of their own. However, to reward the consumer as a distributor of the 
protected files, they will be awarded, either financially or in kind, by the rights holder who benefits 
from the distribution to friends (WIPO, 2003). Services using this technology are not very wide 
spread yet, but for example in Europe, Orange (UK) and Telenor (Norway) customers can send 
preview clips of their favorite songs to friends via text message in their super distribution business 
model (Billboard, 2006). Some fears have been presented with the potential volume of the super 
distribution model. Monstermob CEO Martin Higginson (2005) warned that super distribution, or 
sending music files via Bluetooth to phones or other devices posed a bigger problem than internet 
file-sharing. "In 2010, 2.4 billion people will be able to download music to their phones, the 
potential is enormous, but we must offer it at the right price," Higginson said (Music Week, 2005). 
 The sheer technical complexity of this model may prove to be too much of a constricting 
element for the super distribution model for several years to come. The model can only reach its full 
potential if it offers the possibility to share complete mp3 files via Bluetooth. The technology to do 
this is spreading as we speak, nevertheless not a large enough proportion of the music consumers 
have cellular phones with the required broadband technology. Another challenge for this model is 
figuring out how the revenue is shared if the consumer gets a cut. Will the final price for downloads 
have to be substantially higher than in the competing model because of one more party splitting the 
pie? 
 One thing is for sure: the super distribution model has the largest amount of DRM protection of 
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the models presented to date. Functioning DRM is the life line of this model because of the 
importance of being able to restrict illegal Bluetooth sharing opposed to legal sharing of either 
samples or full songs with limited listening rights. The fear that Higginson presented earlier should 
not be ignored. The results of illegal file sharing with the ease and convenience of a properly 
functioning super distribution system could spell disaster for the music industry very quickly.  
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 2.5.5 Completely DRM free MP3 
The format that has no DRM embedded in it is the traditional mp3 that has been widely spread 
through peer-to-peer types of networks and web sites like the original illegal Napster. The pros of 
being totally DRM free are quite obvious. There are no interoperability problems with classic 
MP3s. If one downloads an MP3 it will work just the same on an iPod as it will on a Microsoft-
based player. It can be copied just like any other computer file without any restrictions or technical 
complications. The problem with this model is the fact that pirating this product is very easy. The 
same qualities that make it convenient to use are the same ones that make it easy to spread illegally.  
 A legal problem has risen from the handling of DRM free MP3s. Even though one can now 
copy legal downloads from a computer to an Ipod and vice versa, it is still stated in some local laws 
that this kind of activity is illegal. Government officials in the UK have stated that the government 
should draw up a new exemption permitting private copying on MP3 players and other household 
gadgets. At the moment the system seems to work in a way that the industry prefers to turn a blind 
eye to private copying and sees it as an acceptable loophole in copyright law. Government officials 
do not believe it is satisfactory that consumers should be advised by the industry that they can 
ignore certain parts of the existing law and not others. Basically the law makers believe that without 
a clear law this establishes a lack of respect for the copyright. The chief of the International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) John Kennedy concedes that introducing a law to 
cover this is a "difficult dilemma," and could exercise lawyers for years. "We as an industry don't 
have a problem copying on to iPods," he says (2007). David Stopps (2007), head of copyright and 
contracts at the Music Managers Forum (MMF), is also disappointed that the law officials do not 
embrace the concept of home copying levies, "On the one hand, the committee says that copying 
within the domestic home should be legalized, but on the other it says there should be no 
compensation for this to authors, performer, record companies and publishers," (Music Week, 
2007). 
 Amazon has made a great run for its money by undertaking the selling of DRM free MP3s. In 
less than a year, it has carved out a digital music market share in the United States of around 8%, 
according to various analyst estimates (Music Week, 2008). 
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3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
3.1. Research question  
This thesis seeks to address the question: Is digital rights management alienating music consumers 
from the legal purchase of music by restricting the consumers through the imposition of digital 
rights management? 
 This research will consider the advantages and disadvantages of DRM embedded releases 
versus DRM free releases and use these findings as criteria in comparing the feasibility of the 
different approaches. Exploring these existing scenarios hopefully provide some insight as to 
whether consumers will accept and learn to use the currently available forms of digital music retail 
or become alienated by the DRM imposition, and subsequently use less frequently or completely 
stop using legal music downloads.  
 The suggestions and opinions of key industry professionals and people with in-depth working 
knowledge of the business and the issue of DRM will be researched. This information will be 
accessed through industry journal articles and face-to-face industry interviews as well as interviews 
published by different medias like websites, magazines etc. If the findings suggest that DRM is 
alienating the customer from using legal music downloads, suggestions will be made about the 
future options that the industry has to win back its consumers. These suggestions will be made on 
the basis of the expert opinions in journals and the one-to-one interviews with industry experts. In 
the following section an overview will be given of different concepts closely related to the subject 
of this thesis, starting with an overview on copyrights and intellectual property law.  
 
3.2 Research methods 
This thesis applies different forms of qualitative research. Respected industry journals have been 
researched to find opinions of music industry professionals. The three face-to-face interviews that 
were carried out were done by using a semi-structured theme interview model where the interview 
questions have been given to the interview subjects in advance (Hirsjärvi & Remes, 1997). Very 
little academic literature has been found pertaining to the effect of the use of digital rights 
management in the music industry. This is why the research in this thesis is heavily weighted on 
journal findings and interview findings. One of the key factors to understanding the effects of DRM 
on the music consumer is a comprehensive understanding of the several different operating models 
of the digital music retail industry. These perspectives can be found in the background research of 
this thesis.  
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4 FINDINGS 
4.1 Interviews  
Three Finnish music industry professionals from three different record companies were interviewed 
for this project. The answers of the industry professionals will be presented in this chapter to the 
extent that they are relevant to the research question of this thesis and the contextual framework 
surrounding the research question. The following six questions were asked from each of the 
professionals. 
1. Is the use of digital rights management alienating the consumer from purchasing legal music?  
2. What is the best digital retail format, Pay-per-download, subscription or other?  Please explicate 
your answer. 
3. Are you in favour of copy-protection on CDs? If yes/no, please elaborate why? 
4. Do you believe that selling DRM-free music can exist as a profitable business model? If not, why 
not? If yes, please elaborate why? 
5. What are the biggest pros and cons in the different digital music retail formats at the moment? 
6. What is going to be the business model that will prevail in the future and will it be DRM based? 
Why? 
 
 4.1.1 Jani Jalonen – Warner Music Finland 
Mr. Jani Jalonen works as a new business developer for Warner Music Finland. Jalonen feels that 
DRM does to some extent alienate music consumers from the legal product of the music industry. 
He elaborates on the subject by saying that in the first couple of years of the current decade, the 
DRM used on CD albums had a very negative effect on the consumers’ experience with the product 
and that the copy-protection they used actually caused the record companies more harm than it ever 
did good. He also goes on saying that throughout the history of digital music the biggest road block 
in the way of expanding the business has been the interoperability problems between different 
formats and types of DRM technologies, “When buying and using the products are difficult, the 
consumer will not use them”. Jalonen feels that the best model for selling digital music so far has 
been Apple Computer’s  iTunes. He goes on to state that iTunes has been superior compared to its 
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competitors in the field of product development. 
 Jalonen thinks that subscription services like Spotify have great potential although these models 
also face a lot of challenges like problems with reporting playlists and revenue distribution. Spotify 
distributes their advertising revenues as a chunk of money and it is quite a lot of work for the record 
companies to divide that bulk of money to the artists in a fair manner. Another challenge for 
subscription models according to Jalonen is the difficulty of acquiring premium customers who pay 
a fixed amount for their music on a monthly basis. “Once you give something for free, it's hard to 
start charging money for it afterwards“ Jalonen said. 
 The interviewee believes that the digital market will keep growing significantly but he does not 
believe that it will make up for the overall losses of the industry, mainly because of the change in 
the overall structure of the music industry. He also goes on to say that nobody knows whether 
selling records – digital or physical - will even be the main source of income for music companies 
in the future. 
 Jalonen seems to be quite confident on one issue. He says that DRM will not be used widely in 
the future of selling music, “The fast paced advancement of technology will make it impossible to 
try to control music on the digital playing field”. 
 
 4.1.2 Saara Manner – Sony Music Finland 
Ms. Saara Manner works as a brand manager in digital and brand partnerships at Sony Music.    
Manner feels that DRM is in fact alienating the consumer from the legal services of the music 
industry. She says that the only digital music store that has successfully been able to embed DRM 
into their product is iTunes. This has happened because of the widespread success of the iPod. 
iTunes and iPods have been a great match, but no other company has had the same kind of 
widespread platform to sell their music to. All the local DRM embedded music stores have failed 
because of interoperability problems. “If your product doesn't work on an iPod no one is going to 
buy it” says Manner.   
 Manner said that in her opinion the best model of selling digital music has not been found yet.  
The main focus at the moment is to get  people that are using illegal models to shift to using the 
legal equivalents. The best ways to do this are the different subscription models that are funded with 
advertising money. One of the current problems of this model for the user is the fact that one cannot 
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access the music database of the site from their portable devices because the model uses streaming 
technology. Because of this there will be a demand for pay-per-download services at least as long as 
technology advances enough to enable streaming for portable devices like mobile phones and MP3 
players. She also goes on to say that Sony Music is going to remove DRM from all of its pay-per-
download music products before the end of 2009.  
 Manner concludes her interview by saying that the music industry is paying the price for 
moving too slowly into the digital world and closing their eyes from the problems for too long.   
She says that “the generation of people that have learned to use illegal models of acquiring digital 
music will not be easy to get to use the legal models”. She elaborates that “the key to luring this 
demographic is via subscription models like Spotify”. Manner also states that Spotify also has the 
most potential of all the existing models because they can generate good incomes through deals 
with Internet providers and mobile service providers. 
 
 4.1.3 Mikko Haapala – Universal Music Finland 
Mr. Mikko Haapala is Universal Music Finland’s digital manager for Finland and the Baltic region. 
Haapala begins by stating that he does not feel that DRM is alienating the music consumer from the 
legal product of the industry. “The people who are complaining about DRM are a small but loud 
minority of music lovers. The core part of the market does not have a problem with DRM as long as 
it does not interfere with their day to day music listening experience” says Haapala. 
 He believes that Nokia's Comes With Music service that will be launched soon will have a large 
impact within the Finnish music industry mainly because of the large penetration that Nokia has in 
the Finnish market. He added that iTunes and subscription models will continue growing although 
the key to the monetary value of subscription models will be decided by the amount of monthly 
paying premium users they are able to attract. Haapala also says that CD copy protection was a 
good example of how DRM should not be implemented. He goes on to elaborate, “It was an 
experiment that failed and CD copy protection will not come back.” 
 Haapala believes that the growth of digital music will explode as soon as the present main 
problems concerning the current models are solved. He does not believe that the digital music 
market will ever grow so much that it will reach the same volume that physical sales generated in 
the golden days of the CD. The reason for this is the simple fact that the market place has changed 
in structure and that there are so many other competitors competing for the same disposable income 
  19 
of the consumer. “Nowadays teenagers have to decide whether they want to spend their money on 
video games, movies or other things. The bottom line is that owning music records is no longer the 
same kind of priority that it used to be in youngsters' lives,” says Haapala. 
 He assesses that the biggest problem that different digital music retail models have at the 
moment continues to be the difficulty of payment online. The older generations are still afraid to 
give their credit card information to third parties online and the youngsters often don't have a credit 
card at all. The interviewee states that the key to solving this problem is to get the mobile phone 
operators to co-operate with music companies. The possibility of paying for music with one's 
mobile phone is crucial to expanding the market. “Unfortunately the price that mobile operators are 
charging for this service is still too high for this payment model to be widely implemented.” said 
Haapala. 
 Interestingly, Haapala also mentions that one of the main problems in the Finnish music 
industry is the high value added tax (VAT) enforced on music. All other cultural products have a 
VAT of eight percent, but for some reason music is taxed at 22 percent. This is something that is 
lobbied by the industry from year to year but no progress has been made yet. Haapala seems 
confident while stating that, “We will see a change in this tax policy soon.” 
 Haapala says that Spotify and iTunes are the best models at the moment and he feels that these 
models will continue to be the predominant ones in the future. He adds that Spotify and other 
subscription models will not survive on advertisement income alone. “They have to be able to 
generate subscription income as well” Haapala said. Haapala concludes the interview by saying that 
“Because subscription models are going to keep on growing in the market place, DRM is a tool that 
has to be used in order to make them work.” 
 
4.2 Journal findings 
The following segment will contain ideas and thoughts of music industry professionals from people 
in the music industry that could not be interviewed face-to-face. All of these statements and ideas 
have been found by means of extensive study of the top industry journals such as Music Week 
magazine and Billboard magazine.  
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4.2.1 Arguments and suggestions made by the music industry  
There is very active opposition toward different forms of DRM in the music industry even though 
most major players in the industry are applying some form of digital rights management. 
Consumers are complaining that when you buy a legal copy, it is inferior to an illegal copy because 
of the limitations set for the consumer. Entertainment Retailers Association (ERA) director general 
Kim Bayley said in Music Week,:  "We are getting the message that people are confused by DRM” 
(2007) ERA, which is positioning itself as the consumers' friend on the matter, took the issue further 
by putting it on the agenda at the ERA/BPI (British Phonographic Industry) joint meeting that took 
place in December 2007.  
 ERA also wants to turn attention to the immense problem of compatibility between different 
merchants' products like iTunes and Zune that is causing frustration among the consumers. As an 
example, the problem with legal downloads is that if the user downloads an illegal mp3 he or she 
could play it on any MP3 player or media player but if the user bought one from iTunes it would 
only work on iPods and iTunes software and vice versa with Microsoft's Zune music store. The 
retail organization publicly set out its case in a letter to the Financial Times in which it urged record 
companies to adopt MP3 as the universal download standard, suggesting that consumers were 
perplexed by the proliferation of different DRM systems and end up giving up on legal downloads. 
Bailey (2007) also says about the industry: "We have to trust people. In the CD world we trust 
people. CDs are DRM free. It should be the same in the digital world." The point is well understood 
by many more liberal industry professionals even though many say that Bailey should know better 
than to say that CDs are DRM free, because some companies are still implementing copy protection 
software on their CDs, which effectively is just one form of digital rights management. Such a view, 
however, may run in to opposition at the BPI? While the organisation is broadly DRM neutral, 
reflecting the differing views of its member record companies, chief executive Geoff Taylor (2007) 
says the following about ERA: "ERA is missing the point in blaming record labels for the lack of 
interoperability," he says. "Its target should be online retailers with proprietary DRMs who refuse to 
license their technology or let it inter-operate with other systems" (Music Week, 2007). 
 Deputy-director of technology for IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry) 
Dr. Richard Gooch takes a very different stand on DRM in his article in Billboard magazine.        
He portrays that DRM is driving new flexible music services for consumers in the digital market. 
He also states that DRM has proved to be the framework that has allowed today's thriving legal 
digital music scene to flourish, making more music available to the public than ever before in more 
formats and distribution channels. It is DRM that gives consumers different options and helps 
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different kinds of services compete (Billboard, 2006). 
 EMI Group CEO Mr. Eric Nicoli (2007) said to Music Week Magazine that it was important to 
educate customers about the value of music, rather than presume guilt and restrict their ability to 
transfer music. "This is still an industry in its infancy," he added (Music Week, 2007).                 
This comment is in great contrast to the comments that Warner CEO Edgar Bronfman (2007) gave 
soon after the statement of Nicoli. Bronfman stated to Music Week Magazine that, "The notion that 
music does not deserve the same protection as software, film, video games or other intellectual 
property, simply because there is an unprotected legacy product in the physical world,  is 
completely without logic or merit” (Music Week, 2007). 
 Warner soon jumped from being a slow shifter to making a deal with MySpace Music for a free 
streaming service that is funded with ad money. They argued that by finding a way to monetize the 
manner in which consumers are already interacting with music rather than trying to force them into 
a business model convenient to the industry, they can finally tap a vein of hope for their struggling 
fortunes. Warner Music Group chairman, CEO Edgar Bronfman Jr. (2008) perhaps said it best in his 
statement distributed with the MySpace Music press release: "This venture may provide a defining 
blueprint for this next important stage in the evolution of social media, benefiting consumers, artists 
and music companies alike." 
 This model could have serious implications for the digital industry as we know it. First, it 
might mark the end of the digital warehouse model like iTunes and Amazon. Both will remain 
important contributors to the industry's revenue for the next several years, but that model is fading 
away and we are unlikely to see new, similar services come to light.  Second, subscription services 
like Napster and Rhapsody are even more vulnerable. They should have worked to integrate their 
service more deeply with an existing social network, as Rhapsody is trying to do with MOG, before 
those social networks develop their own solution like MySpace Music has. It also seems like these 
older subscription models need to immediately find a way to eliminate the monthly fee in their 
service or it will find itself competing with another free opponent, this one being legal (Billboard, 
2008). 
 
 4.2.2 What direction is the industry leaning towards based on the findings in industry 
journals? 
Shortly after the decision by EMI to begin offering the seemingly DRM free pay-per-download 
format on iTunes (as presented in the background research earlier in this thesis), the other majors 
made the same decision, the last one being Sony-BMG in January 2008. All of the majors adhered 
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to roughly the same pricing system as EMI in which the new format was slightly more expensive as 
the original DRM equipped format (Billboard, 2008). 
 The older advocates of the subscription model, Napster and Rhapsody, are facing serious times 
with the launch of Nokia's Comes With Music service and MySpace Music. The Comes With Music 
service proposes to include the price of a one-year unlimited music subscription service in the cost 
of the mobile phone that supports it. As of now, all major labels except EMI are onboard.         
Many questions remain about how the idea will be implemented at launch, which is expected in 
October 2008 in the UK. How much extra will the device cost? How much will labels get?        
How free is the consumer to use the content they acquire? Nevertheless the main issue here is the 
model, not the execution. Labels are shifting strategy and focusing on getting a cut of the overall 
cost of either devices or services that use their content, rather than just the cost of the music itself 
(Billboard, 2008). 
 MySpace Music, the second big time player to enter the digital music retail business is also 
launching its new venture soon. MySpace Music is a joint venture with the major labels and the 
original Newscorp affiliate MySpace. The majors in the joint venture have agreed with MySpace 
that they will profit not only from a cut of the ad and sales revenue, but also in the underlying 
revenue the venture receives, even from content contributed by other of the MySpace Music 
services content. 
Mr. Charles Caldas (2008), CEO of indie music licensing group Merlin, criticized this 
arrangement, arguing that it allows major labels to profit from the use of indie music at MySpace 
Music without giving independent record companies the ability to profit from the venture as equity 
partners. "Without an equitable participation by independents, that creates a situation that is both 
unhealthy and dangerous," Caldas says, acknowledging that Merlin is nonetheless in licensing talks 
with MySpace Music (Billboard, 2008). 
 By contrast, Orchard CEO Greg Scholl (2008) downplayed the immediate importance of 
securing an equity stake in MySpace Music. The opportunity to create an ancillary revenue stream 
and ignite growth in the sector is, on balance, more important to our clients than holding out for an 
equity stake of uncertain future value that will likely never come to pass Scholl says. "We will 
continue to press our case for equity or profit sharing for the independent sector, but in the 
meantime, we will ensure our clients prosper from the value MySpace Music creates." Sholl goes 
on to say (Billboard, 2008). 
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5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Analysis and conclusions 
In the three face-to-face interviews carried out for this thesis there were a lot of similar thoughts 
that emerged from the interviewees. Surprisingly, one of the three interviewees felt, that DRM does 
not alienate music consumers and two of the interviewees believed that some degree of alienation 
has happened and will keep happening if DRM is enforced. One of the three interviewees was 
convinced that consumers are not alienated from using the legal products of the music industry and 
the other two felt that DRM has alienated the music consumers to some extent. Jalonen from 
Warner Music, was most opposed to DRM of the three interviewees, and he believed that DRM will 
not be a part of the future of digital music retail. Interestingly, he did not go on to elaborate on how 
certain subscription models can function without the use of DRM. Manner and Haapala believe that 
subscription models need DRM to function. Manner was convinced that the pay-per-download 
model will not have DRM in it in the future. All three of the interviewees agreed that the digital 
music industry will keep growing as problems with interoperability and payment methods are 
solved but at the same time all of the three were skeptical on whether the music industry in its 
current format will ever reach the same volume as in its best years in the mid-nineties.   
 The opinions of the interviewees seemed to reflect the findings from the review of music 
industry journals. The majority of the opinions of music industry professionals seem to be leaning 
on the side of a DRM free music environment although most of the professionals also go on to say 
that certain models like the subscription model need DRM to function.   
 The opinion of Universal Music's Mikko Haapala seems to be the most controversial and 
opposite to most of the opinions found in journals and other interviews. He fails to elaborate on his 
opinions concerning confusion among consumers that Kim Bayley (2007) from ERA so clearly 
portrays in his interview with Music Week. Haapala also goes on to ignore the interoperability 
problems by stating that everything is fine as long as the DRM works with the hardware and the 
DRM does not clash with the user experience of the customer. As was presented in the background 
research chapter of this thesis, these interoperability problems still exist and are only now after 
many years beginning to be solved. 
 It would seem like DRM is in fact alienating the consumers from purchasing legal digital 
music. Most of the debate on the subject seems to rise from whether the degree of this alienation is 
severe enough to actually have a lasting and profound effect on the industry. Some industry experts 
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like Haapala from Universal Music and Edgar Bronfman Jr. from Warner Music believe that music 
must be protected just like all other copyrighted products and people will understand that and accept 
the restrictions that follow. Other experts like Nicoli from EMI music and Jalonen from Warner 
Music Finland deem that the industry must abandon DRM before the consumer decides to 
completely abandon the music industry.  
 While the digital retail models are being tested by the markets it seems like we are facing a 
divided music industry, where most independent labels are opposed to copy protection, EMI has 
fully embraced - and Universal is experimenting with DRM-free downloads. Sony BMG is going 
from being supportive of DRM to slowly getting rid of DRM on their pay-per-download releases, 
and Warner has shifted from strongly opposing the dropping of copy protection to dropping it 
completely in their newest venture (Music Week, 2007). 
 Achieved industry analyst and senior writer for Billboard magazine Antony Bruno (2007) 
suggests that digital rights management technology has reached a fork in the road. One road 
represents the status quo, locking music with protective software that requires devices to have the 
corresponding key to play or even recognize the files, yet restricts users from transferring tracks to 
different devices. The other road represents a radical new future: unprotected music files that let 
users freely play their music on any device and distribute it online, but allow labels to identify, track 
and potentially monetize that activity. Which road gains the most traffic largely depends on how the 
industry reacts to the reactions and results of such pioneering acts as EMI's recent decision to sell 
unprotected digital music via iTunes and other services (Billboard, 2007). 
 It seems like even in the divided music industry a consensus has been reached that if DRM is to 
be used widely in the future of selling digital music, a solution to the current interoperability 
problem needs to be found. As long as music purchased from sources other than iTunes will not 
work with the iPod, the outlook of the DRM protected pay-per-download model is bleak. The 
consensus within the industry seems to be that DRM is in fact alienating the consumers from the 
legal product of the industry, at least to some extent. The debate seems to now dwell on whether this 
is a big enough problem for the industry to completely abandon DRM or to work on solving the 
problems of existing DRM. There are two schools of thought on the subject. On one hand there is 
the argument made by Haapala from Universal Music Finland who says that DRM is not the reason 
for declining sales and that the people protesting are merely a loud minority and that the main core 
of the market are not alienated by the use of DRM. On the other hand there is the EMI Groups 
approach which is heavily leaning towards completely getting rid of DRM in digital music.  
 What about on the other side of the crossroads, the one that Bruno is suggesting? Even if every 
record label were to abandon DRM and sell unprotected digital files, they'll still expect to make 
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money by doing so. In a world where music is unrestricted, the definition of DRM would have to 
change from a means of control to a means of monetization. 
 Some DRM experts, such as Bill Rosenblatt (2007) of GiantStep Media Technology Strategies, 
say there could even be a schism among the major labels where some follow the road first 
suggested and stick with DRM and others the road that abandons DRM. If this were to happen, the 
final winner of this format war would be decided by the market. The question is, will the consumer 
stick around to see the major companies fight for several more years putting aside the will of the 
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6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
It seems there are three factors that need to be carefully taken into consideration by the music 
retailing industry while developing a successful sales model in order to satisfy the consumer rather 
than alienating them from the process with excessive red tape and consumer restrictions. These 
factors are convenience, content and price. Convenience includes aspects like an accessible and 
easy to use software platform, total interoperability with different music players and portable 
devices, and ease of payment. One of the main reasons why Amazon was able to grow their market 
share so rapidly was the 81 million people that already had their credit card information stored in 
the Amazon database from their previous purchases. Once again, content is key. A functioning 
digital retail model will not work unless it features a catalogue of songs that truly satisfies the 
average consumer. This would seem to require the catalogues of all the major labels and the larger 
independent labels at the least. The issue of price does not necessarily have to focus on how cheap 
or expensive the service is. More important is getting the consumer to feel as they are getting some 
return on their investment. The other important aspect is to have a consistent and logically 
understandable pricing system. It has already been proved that the public is willing to pay for digital 
music, which quite frankly is astonishing when considering how clumsy and restrictive the product 
is that they have received so far. Pulling together the thoughts put forward by the industry and the 
experiences that have been observed from the market, the model that will thrive and be the most 
successful will no doubt be one that brings together the best aspects of all these different digital 
retail models. 
 It seems that the future model will be a subscription service that applies factors from the pay-
per-download model (with or without DRM) and even the super distribution model once mobile 
technology is widespread and efficient enough for it to work in the core of the consumer market.    
In this subscription service the basic subscription plan would perhaps not cost the consumer 
anything - the consumer would only have to submit his or her account information and be willing to 
accept some advertisements while using the service. The foundation of the funding for this model 
would come from advertisement money and from other premium services provided to the consumer 
for extra cost and would be divided to the participating companies according to tracking of what 
songs get played in what ratio.  
 In addition there would be a pay-per-download service that would offer interoperable music 
files that may or may not be embedded with fingerprinting DRM to be able to track the sold files, 
were they to be distributed in an illegal fashion. These pay-per-download files would cost the 
standard amount defined by iTunes and other market leaders. The incentive for purchasing them 
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would be the possibility to listen to the song on one's portable device, burn it to a CD, and of course 
the fact that the sound quality would be better compared to the streamed equivalent.  
 In the future this model should also attempt to tap into the huge potential of the super 
distribution model. The challenge with the super distribution model as earlier noted is the heavy 
amount of DRM that has to be embedded into the product to keep from it turning into a free-for-all 
file sharing medium.  
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